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Articles 
ENGULFED BY THE SPECTRUM:  THE IMPACT 
OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS ON LAW 
AND POLICY 
Sheryl Dicker and Emily Bennett* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, public service announcements have alerted 
the public to a new public health crisis:  the growth of Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (“ASD”) among children.  Many of the announcements use 
inflammatory language, such as: 
• “The odds of a child being in a Broadway show are 1 in 
11,000; the odds of a child being diagnosed with Autism:  1 
in 166.”1 
• “The odds of a babysitter calling 911:  1 in 1400; the odds of a 
child being diagnosed with Autism:  1 in 150.”2 
These advertisements are part of a public health strategy to warn parents 
and the public about the growing incidence of Autism and to seek 
support for finding the cause or cure for this perceived epidemic.  In fact, 
the most recent estimates from the Center for Disease Control for the 
number of children diagnosed with Autism is 1 in 110,3 while the 
American Academy of Pediatrics estimates that number closer to 110 in 
10,000.4  Additionally, recent government estimates suggest that the 
annual cost to society for children and adults with ASDs is between $35 
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Emily Bennett is a J.D. Candidate, 2011, at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  The 
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1 Harley Graham—Autism Speaks Commercial December 2008, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGCm12S_7ZQ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
2 Autism Awareness Babysitter, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cCMR 
La25Mw (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
3 See Autism Spectrum Disorders:  Data & Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (May 13, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html (“It is 
estimated that between 1 in 80 and 1 in 240 with an average of 1 in 110 children in the 
United States have an ASD.”). 
4 Michael D. Kogan et al., Prevalence of Parent-Reported Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder Among Children in the US, 2007, 124 PEDIATRICS 1395, 1397 (2009), 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/124/5/1395. 
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and $90 billion.5  Despite all of the warnings and millions of dollars 
raised, the cause or cure of Autism has not been found and few 
evidence-based effective treatments have been uncovered.  In addition to 
the public awareness campaigns, the high prevalence of ASD has had an 
unrecognized, though profound, impact on public policy and law. 
This Article argues that the growing prevalence of ASD is shaping 
current law and policy relating to all disabilities and will have a 
profound impact on children with disabilities, particularly concerning 
special education.  Indeed, over the last decade almost 700 federal court 
cases have involved Autism and special education.  Autism cases and 
policy are setting new legal standards and initiating changing 
interpretations of the law.  Additionally, a large percentage of funds 
have been earmarked for intensive—yet often unsupported by 
research—services in more restrictive settings.  Conflicts among the 
federal circuit courts concerning many key special education issues, 
however, further complicate this changing area of law. 
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to ASD and its 
treatment as well as presents the history of special education law in the 
United States.  In Part III, the Article provides the first survey of ASD 
and the law by tracing the evolution of Autism in the courts and 
analyzing the major trends that have emerged from thousands of court 
cases that involve diagnosis, treatment, placement, and funding of 
services, as well as redress from alleged injuries from vaccinations 
concerning ASD.  In Part IV, the Article charts recent federal and state 
legislative enactments relating to ASD, focusing on insurance, the new 
federal health care reform legislation,6 funding, education practices, 
lifespan services, and new state oversight mechanisms.  In essence, ASD 
is engulfing the law, policy, and funding of the disability world, though 
this impact has yet to be recognized by the broader community.  
Although the full effects of this prevalence remain to be seen, this Article 
attempts to both bring attention to the extensive impact of ASD cases 
and begin to analyze the ramifications of this reality. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF ASD AND THE LAW 
Autism is not a specific disorder but a neurodevelopmental 
disability characterized by problems in reciprocal social interaction 
                                                 
5 INTERAGENCY AUTISM COORDINATING COMM., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER RESEARCH 1 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter 
IACC STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.iacc.hhs.gov/strategic-plan/2010/IACC_ 
2010_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
6 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-108, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 
2010). 
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(difficulty in reading social cues, poor peer relations, failure to seek 
enjoyment), communication impairments (delay or failure to speak or 
conversational difficulties), and often repetitive and restricted patterns of 
behavior7 (unusual preoccupations, compulsive behaviors and rituals).8  
It varies in its severity from mild to severe but retains those key 
characteristics in various forms throughout life.  As a result of the range 
of impairments, it is referred to as a spectrum disorder:  ASD.9  While it 
was first observed in the 1940s,10 only the recent prevalence of the 
disorder has shined a spotlight on ASD. 
Prior to 1975, children with severe disabilities, including children 
with ASD, were often excluded by law from attending school.11  Without 
an education, many of these children spent their lives in institutions.  
After years of vigorous parent advocacy that included a series of 
successful class action lawsuits in the early 1970s, Congress passed the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975 (“EHA”).12  The Act 
guaranteed a “free appropriate public education for all handicapped 
children” (“FAPE”).13  All children with Autism were covered by the 
Act, as were children with any other handicapping conditions.  
However, because Autism was a rare, low-incidence disability in 1975, it 
was not specifically mentioned as a disability category under the new 
law, and children with Autism were categorized instead as “seriously 
emotionally disturbed” or as having “childhood psychosis.”14 
The Act was amended in 1986 to create two new programs:  Early 
Intervention for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities (serving children 
from birth to age three) and the Pre-School Special Education Program 
(for children ages three to five).15  Once again, Autism was not 
                                                 
7 Comm. on Children with Disabilities, The Pediatrician’s Role in the Diagnosis and 
Management of Autistic Spectrum Disorders, 107 PEDIATRICS 5 (2001). 
8 Catherine Lord & Somer L. Bishop, Autism Spectrum Disorders: Diagnosis, Prevalence 
and Services for Children and Families, 24 SOC. POL’Y REP. 3 (2010). 
9 Id. 
10 Leo Kanner, Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact, 2 NERVOUS CHILD 217 (1943). 
11 See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875–76 (D.D.C. 1972) (explaining that 
the D.C. Board of Education argued that children could not be educated in the public 
schools because of their disabilities and that the cost of providing education was 
prohibitive). 
12 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
13 Id. § 613(a)(2), 89 Stat. at 782. 
14 EDITH FAIRMAN COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 77-227 SP, AUTISTIC CHILDREN:  
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE CONCERN 3, 19 (1977). 
15 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 11 Stat. 
1145 (1986). 
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mentioned in the 1986 amendments.16  It remained a low-incidence 
disability, with occurrence estimated at 1 in 2500 children.17 
It was not until the Act was amended again in 1990 that Autism was 
listed as one of the disorders under the definition of the term “children 
with disabilities.”18  The amendment also changed the name of the Act to 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).19  The IDEA 
was amended most recently by the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act of 2004.20  This amendment specifically 
called for developing and improving programs to train special education 
teachers on the needs of children with ASDs.21  In 2006, the Department 
of Education augmented prior regulations to assist in implementing the 
IDEA.22  The regulation defines Autism as follows: 
 (i) Autism means a developmental disability 
significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal 
communication and social interaction, generally evident 
before age three, that adversely affects a child's 
educational performance.  Other characteristics often 
associated with autism are engagement in repetitive 
activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to 
environmental change or change in daily routines, and 
unusual responses to sensory experiences. 
 (ii) Autism does not apply if a child's educational 
performance is adversely affected primarily because the 
child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in 
paragraph (c)(4) of this section.23 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 See Autism Decline, AUTISM COACH, http://www.autismcoach.com (follow “Autism 
Declines as States Ban Mercury from Vaccines” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 24, 2010) 
(citing David A. Geier & Mark R. Geier, Early Downward Trends in Neurodevelopmental 
Disorders Following Removal of Thimerosal-Containing Vaccines, 11 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & 
SURGEONS 8, 8 (2006)) (“Between 1989 and 2003, there was an explosion of autism.  The 
incidence of autism (and other related disorders) went from about 1 in 2,500 children to 1 
in every 166.”). 
18 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–476, 
§ 101(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1103. 
19 Id. § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 1142. 
20 Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482, 
9567–9567b (2006)). 
21 Id. § 662, 118 Stat. at 2774–75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1462(b)(2)(G)). 
22 Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300 
(2006). 
23 Id. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)–(ii).  It is worth noting that the number of students identified within 
the education system does not match the prevalence statistics described above; far fewer 
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Finally, in 2006, Congress expanded its Autism focus by enacting the 
Combating Autism Act, which provides federal funding to support 
Autism research, screening, intervention, and education.24 
In light of these statutes and the evolution of the federal 
government’s recognition of Autism as a unique disability, this Article 
will examine the development of case law interpreting the provisions 
described above and applying these statutes to individual cases of ASD. 
III.  SPECIAL EDUCATION LITIGATION:  EXPANSIVE BUT NOT COHESIVE 
A. Background:  Board of Education v. Rowley 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v. 
Rowley is the touchstone of current case law affecting children with 
disabilities and their rights under the EHA, now called the IDEA.25  In 
Rowley, the Supreme Court determined what constitutes a “free and 
appropriate education” as guaranteed by the IDEA.26  Amy Rowley was 
a deaf child who received educational accommodations pursuant to an 
Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) during her kindergarten 
year.27  These accommodations included an FM hearing aid, sign 
language training for several school staff, and communication devices in 
the school office for her parents, who were also deaf.28  In preparing the 
IEP for Amy’s first grade year, her parents requested a sign language 
interpreter for all academic classes, but the school rejected this request as 
unnecessary.29  The lower court sided with Amy’s parents because an 
interpreter would maximize Amy’s learning potential.30  The Supreme 
Court reversed and held that federal law does not require maximization 
of a child’s learning potential; schools do not have to bring a student 
with disabilities up to the level of her peers or maximize her learning 
                                                                                                             
children are being classified as autistic under the IDEA than what other research would 
suggest.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Children 3 to 21 Years 
Old Served in Federally Supported Programs for the Disabled, by Type of Disability:  Selected 
Years, 1976-77 through 2007–08 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=64 
(reporting that in 2007–08 school year, the U.S. Department of Education was supporting 
296,000 children with Autism, constituting 4.5% of the total student population served 
under the IDEA). 
24 Pub. L. No. 109-416, 120 Stat. 2821 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 280i–280i-4, 283j 
(2006)). 
25 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
26 Id. at 188. 
27  Id. at 184. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 184–85. 
30 Id. at 185–86. 
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potential in order to meet the legal standard.31  Because her current 
educational accommodations were “adequate,” additional services were 
not necessary.32  This holding is central to all subsequent discussions in 
this Article. 
B. When is a Child on the Autism Spectrum? 
Before Autism Spectrum Disorders were as prevalent as they are 
today, children with ASDs were often misdiagnosed and put into other 
categories, such as “seriously emotionally disturbed.”33  Incorrect 
diagnoses meant that students often did not receive appropriate services.  
Today, when determining whether a child is on the autism spectrum, 
courts rely exclusively on the IDEA definition of Autism, a definition 
that focuses on educational performance.34  They do not place weight on 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (“DSM-
IV”) definition.35  This can be confusing since most clinicians 
traditionally use the DSM-IV for reference.  By contrast, the DSM-IV 
provides a more in-depth description of the various behaviors a child 
with Autism might exhibit by age three.  It does not focus on educational 
deficits nor does it exclude children with primary emotional 
disturbance.36 
                                                 
31 Id. at 198. 
32 Id. at 209. 
33 Supra text accompanying note 14. 
34 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (2006) (defining autism in terms of educational 
performance). 
35 See infra note 36 (providing the DSM-IV definition of Autism). 
36 The DSM-IV defines Autism as follows: 
A.  A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two 
from (1), and one each from (2) and (3): 
(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by 
at least two of the following: 
(a) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal 
behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body 
postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction 
(b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to 
developmental level 
(c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, 
interests, or achievements with other people (e.g., by a lack 
of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest) 
(d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at 
least one of the following: 
(a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken 
language (not accompanied by an attempt to compensate 
through alternative modes of communication such as 
gesture or mime) 
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In School District of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, a district court 
concluded that the hearing officer erred in determining that Autism, as 
defined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i), was synonymous with the disorders 
included in the definition of Pervasive Developmental Disorder (“PDD”) 
in the DSM-IV and, therefore, that a child diagnosed with “Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” would automatically 
exhibit behaviors that would be classified as Autism under the IDEA.37  
The court also noted “that the term autism does not apply ‘if a child's 
educational performance is adversely affected primarily because the 
child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (b)(4) of 
[§ 300.7].’”38  Thus, when a child’s medical diagnosis suggests that she or 
he may have an ASD, but that child is educationally on grade level or the 
student has consistently been diagnosed as suffering from an emotional 
disturbance, an IEP classification of Autism may not be permissible. 
Similarly, a Review Officer in an administrative decision by New 
York’s State Review Office (“SRO”) determined that a child met the New 
York statutory definition of Autism and was therefore appropriately 
classified as autistic despite having been diagnosed by a private 
                                                                                                             
(b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment 
in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others 
(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or 
idiosyncratic language 
(d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social 
imitative play appropriate to developmental level 
(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, 
interests, and activities, as manifested by at least one of the 
following: 
(a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more 
stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is 
abnormal either in intensity or focus 
(b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional 
routines or rituals 
(c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand 
or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body 
movements) 
(d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
B.  Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following 
areas, with onset prior to age 3 years:  (1) social interaction, (2) 
language as used in social communication, or (3) symbolic or 
imaginative play. 
C.  The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder. 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 75 
(4th ed. 2000). 
37 184 F. Supp. 2d 860, 877–78 (W.D. Wis. 2001), aff’d 295 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2002). 
38 Id. at 878 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(1)(i) (2001), which became 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.8(c)(1)(i) by 2007). 
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psychologist with pervasive developmental disorder “with only Autistic-
like features.”39  The Review Officer distinguished between a clinical 
diagnosis of Autism and characteristics fitting the educational definition 
of Autism, noting that only the latter is relevant for provision of services 
under the IDEA.40  Another SRO decision several years later reaffirmed 
that the relevant definition for the purposes of classifying a child for 
special education services is the statutory definition rather than the 
DSM-IV definition.41 
In contrast, the hearing officer in Student v. Greenwich Board of 
Education cited both the statutory and DSM-IV definitions of Autism in 
determining that a child was entitled to a classification of Autism.42  
However, in that case, the school district disputed the child’s 
classification as autistic even though the child squarely met the statutory 
definition of Autism.43  The hearing officer did not base the child’s 
entitlement to services on the DSM-IV definition, but rather used this 
definition to lend more strength to his decision to classify the child as 
autistic.44  Thus, this decision is consistent with the general rule that 
entitlement to IDEA special education services should be based 
exclusively on the statutory definition of Autism. 
The question of whether ASDs are curable disorders or a 
developmental disability is currently debated.  Historically, government 
agencies have treated ASDs as developmental disorders, implying that 
they are lifelong conditions.45  Paradoxically, at least one court has 
implied that a diagnosis of ASD is not lifelong, nor does it necessarily 
warrant continuous services for a child.46  In Eric H. v. Judson Independent 
School District, the court focused only on symptoms the child currently 
exhibited, rather than on previously exhibited symptoms; the court ruled 
that the school district acted properly by removing a child’s classification 
as autistic after a thorough re-evaluation by a qualified examiner showed 
                                                 
39 N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, SRO 91-28 (Sept. 5, 1991) (emphasis omitted), available at 
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/1991/91-028.htm; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(zz)(1) (2009) (showing that New York’s current statutory definition of 
Autism is identical to the federal definition as stated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)). 
40 Supra note 39. 
41 N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, SRO 99-3 (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://www.sro.nysed. 
gov/decisionindex/1999/99-003.htm. 
42 Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 02-257 (July 24, 2003). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncbddd/autism/index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
46 Eric H. v. Johnson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-01-CA-0804 NN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20646, at *29–30 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002). 
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that the child no longer had symptoms of Asperger’s Syndrome.47  The 
parents did not argue that the child did not exhibit symptoms at that 
time; they only argued that the autistic classification should remain in 
place because if it were removed and the child’s services were stopped, it 
would negatively affect the child’s learning and behavior in the future.48  
Thus, according to this particular case, a child cannot be classified as 
autistic, and special education and related services cannot be in place, 
unless a child is currently exhibiting symptoms that qualify him for an 
autistic classification.  This holding, however, conflicts with the reality 
that while early intervention and various treatment options can have 
positive outcomes, Autism is consistently viewed as a lifelong 
developmental disability.49 
C. What Services Are Required for a Child on the Autism Spectrum? 
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has determined that in 
order to satisfy the requirements of FAPE, the disabled student’s IEP 
only has to be reasonably calculated to provide some educational 
benefits.50  Further compounding the challenges parents face when 
obtaining services for their autistic child, the Supreme Court recently 
held in an ASD case that parents seeking relief have the burden of proof 
in all cases under the IDEA.51  These decisions are concrete examples of 
how the growing prevalence of ASD litigation is shaping all law 
concerning disability. 
Schools are required to work with parents to prepare or review an 
IEP annually for every student with a disability.52  In theory, an IEP 
ensures that education strategies are uniquely tailored to the needs of the 
particular child.53  In addition to detailing educational services, 
strategies, and accommodations, an IEP should identify benchmarks for 
tracking progress.  Both school officials and parents participate in the IEP 
process, and states are required to provide an administrative path for 
                                                 
47 Id. at *36. 
48 Id. at *8. 
49 See, e.g., Understanding and Evaluating Your Options, AUTISM SOC’Y AM. (Jan. 24, 2008), 
http://www.autism-society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=life_treat_options (implying 
that Autism is a lifelong disability by talking about various lifelong treatments). 
50 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982). 
51 See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (“The burden of proof in an administrative 
hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief.  In this case, 
that party is . . . represented by his parents.”). 
52 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006) (describing evaluation requirements and eligibility 
determinations for IEPs). 
53 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. 
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parents to challenge any aspect of their child’s educational program or 
the IEP.54 
Again, in Rowley, the Supreme Court determined that the school 
district does not need to maximize a child’s learning.55  Circuit courts 
have elaborated and interpreted the Rowley decision, sometimes arriving 
at conflicting conclusions.56  For example, the Second Circuit held that an 
IEP must provide “more than ‘mere trivial advancement’” for the 
student.57  The Tenth Circuit, noting that a FAPE “is hardly self-
defining,” characterized the requirement as simply more than de 
minimis.58  Thus, a school is not obligated to provide a student with ASD 
with the best program for addressing Autism but rather a program that 
is reasonably calculated to help the child achieve some educational 
benefit as outlined in Rowley.59  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently 
concluded—based on post-Rowley amendments to the IDEA—that an 
IEP is required “to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit.’”60 
The determination of what services a student is entitled to turns on 
whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable [him or her] to 
receive educational benefits.”61  Four factors from Cypress-Fairbanks 
Independent School District v. Michael F. are particularly helpful in 
determining whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to provide a 
meaningful educational benefit under the IDEA.”62  In the sixth grade, 
Michael F. was diagnosed with Tourette’s Syndrome, a neurological 
impairment with behavioral components sometimes similar to Autism.63  
                                                 
54 See id. at 181–84 (summarizing the statutory requirements related to IEP creation and 
implementation as well as the recourse options for dissatisfied parents under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415 (2006)). 
55 Id. at 192; see also supra Part III.A (explicating the circumstances surrounding the case). 
56 For more information on circuit differences, see, for example, Lester Aron, Too Much 
or Not Enough:  How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free Appropriate Public Education After 
Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).  “Specifically, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply the ‘meaningful benefit’ test.  The First, Eighth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits employ the ‘adequate benefit’ or ‘some benefit’ test.  Finally, 
the Seventh Circuit appears to use a mixture of the two.”  Aron, supra, at 7; see also Philip 
T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit" or "Maximum Benefit":  Does the No Child Left Behind Act Render 
Greater Education Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 347, 357–62 (2008) 
(comparing the “meaningful benefit” standard, the “adequate benefit” standard, the 
Seventh Circuit’s mixed standards, and the recent decision from the United States 
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights). 
57 Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997). 
58 Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2008). 
59 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. 
60 N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008). 
61 Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1148 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo 
Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 978 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
62 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997). 
63 Id. at 248–49. 
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His parents and the school committee worked together to construct an 
appropriate IEP for Michael, though his parents eventually placed him in 
a residential facility due to his violent behaviors.64  This placement lasted 
until they could no longer afford the tuition.65  His parents sought 
reimbursement of the private tuition and were denied.66  They appealed, 
and the court identified the following four factors to evaluate the IEP 
that the school district proposed: 
(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the 
student's assessment and performance; (2) the program 
is administered in the least restrictive environment; (3) 
the services are provided in a coordinated and 
collaborative manner by the key “stakeholders” [which 
includes individual teachers, school administrators, and 
the child’s counselors]; and (4) positive academic and 
non-academic benefits are demonstrated.67 
The Rowley definition of FAPE imposes unfortunate limits on what 
type of services children with ASDs are guaranteed.  In terms of specific 
methods of teaching autistic children, there has been much controversy 
surrounding whether parents are entitled to an Applied Behavior 
Analysis program (“ABA”), which was the first treatment identified by 
research as an effective therapeutic strategy for children with Autism.68  
However, questions remain regarding its efficacy for all children with 
ASD, including the needed intensity of therapy.  ABA is premised on the 
idea that children with Autism are less likely to develop behaviors based 
on observation alone and thus require direct repetitive instruction to 
develop certain habits.69  ABA primarily uses clear instructions and 
                                                 
64 Id. at 249–51. 
65 Id. at 251. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 253; see also Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d 
286, 290–91, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying the Michael F. factors in an appeal by a school 
district that had been required by a district court to reimburse the family of a disabled 
student for expenses incurred while the student resided in a psychiatric facility). 
68 See, e.g., IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23 (“Behavioral Therapies, such as 
Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) based therapies, which use the principles of 
reinforcement and repetition, have been used since the 1960s and have been studied most 
extensively.”). 
69 See, e.g., What is Applied Behavior Analysis?, CENTER FOR AUTISM & RELATED DISORDERS, 
INC., http://www.centerforautism.com/getting_started/aba.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2011); 
O. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in 
Young Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1987); John J. McEachin, 
Tristram Smith & O. Ivar Lovaas, Long-Term Outcome for Children With Autism Who Received 
Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment, 97 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 359 (1993). 
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positive reinforcement techniques to teach behaviors that may not 
otherwise be learned through observation.  It reinforces behaviors to the 
point that they are fluent or part of the child’s everyday life.  The 
regiment requires painstaking repetition and an enormous investment of 
time and money.  Yet, few other therapies are evidence-based, and the 
intensity and duration for ABA remains an issue for research.70 
In 2010, the first randomized control study to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of a comprehensive behavior development program for 
toddlers was conducted.71  The Early Start Denver Model (“ESDM”) is a 
comprehensive program using ABA strategies plus social 
enhancements.72  The study concluded that the ESDM was more effective 
than the programs currently available in the community.73  The 
interventions began when the children were under two and a half years 
of age.74  The study randomly assigned forty-eight toddlers diagnosed 
with ASD into one of two groups:  one group received the ESDM 
program, delivered by a trained therapist who integrates ABA with 
developmental and relationship-based approaches; the other group 
received “intervention recommendations and referrals for intervention 
from commonly available community providers in the . . . region.”75  
Results showed an increase in IQ, language, and adaptive behavior and 
improved Autism diagnoses.76  Yet, the issue of intensity—the number of 
hours per day and per week—remained untested.77 
While the aforementioned study represents recent progress, the case 
law has historically focused on ABA.  Based on the Rowley definition of 
FAPE, however, courts often decide that a child is not necessarily 
entitled to an ABA program—even when parents can prove the 
effectiveness of this program for their child—if the school provides an 
alternative program that gives the child some meaningful benefit.78 
                                                 
70 See generally IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23 (“Of the numerous behavioral 
interventions currently in use, little scientific evidence from randomized controlled trials 
(RCT) supports their efficacy.”). 
71 Geraldine Dawson et al., Randomized, Controlled Trial of an Intervention for Toddlers With 
Autism:  The Early Start Denver Model, 125 PEDIATRICS e17, e18, e22 (January 2010) (reporting 
that the Early Start Denver Model was more effective with toddlers than other 
interventions available in the community). 
72 Id. at e18. 
73 Id. at e22. 
74 Id. at e18. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at e22. 
77 See id. at e18 (indicating that the study was based on twenty hours of therapy per 
week, but that the study did not undertake to address variations in frequency or duration 
within the program). 
78 E.g., J.P. ex rel. Popson v. W. Clark Cmty. Sch., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 945–46 (S.D. Ind. 
2002). 
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In J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Community Schools, the parents of a 
child with Autism disagreed with the school district about how critical 
ABA therapy was to the educational services needed for their child.79  
J.P. was diagnosed with Autism when he was twenty-six months old.80  
At this time, he did not use any words, did not use vocalizations with his 
body movements, and was not yet toilet-trained; most significant, at age 
two he did not engage in any appropriate play.81  His communication 
skills were rated on the level of a four- to eight-month-old and his 
receptive communication skills on the level of an eight- to sixteen-
month-old.82  While the district offered ABA therapy, it believed that a 
combination of other strategies was appropriate for J.P.83  His parents, on 
the other hand, believed that ABA was so far superior to these methods 
that the alternative options were not appropriate.84  The court refused to 
accept the parents’ argument that ABA should be recognized as the only 
acceptable way to teach autistic children.85  Instead, the court noted that 
the child’s teachers, as well as outside educational experts, approved the 
program the school used to teach students with Autism.86  Therefore, the 
court held that the school was not obligated to implement the parents’ 
desired program.87 
Similarly, in a Massachusetts administrative hearing, the hearing 
officer concluded that even though there was credible evidence that a 
student with Autism benefited tremendously from his home ABA 
program, there was also evidence that he was successful with the 
school’s program once the ABA stopped.88  Because the student was able 
to make meaningful progress without ABA, it was not a denial of a FAPE 
to exclude ABA services from the IEP.89  Thus, there is not a set approach 
embraced universally by courts.  Instead, the test remains whether the 
child benefits from the program—not whether it is the best possible 
program. 
Despite the holdings above that indicate that ABA therapy is not 
usually required if districts have another program that will provide 
benefits to a child, school districts are not permitted to institute a policy 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 920. 
81 Id. at 921. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 916–17. 
84 Id. at 930. 
85 Id. at 939. 
86 Id. at 917. 
87 Id. 
88 Middleborough Pub. Sch., Mass. Bureau Special Educ. Appeals, BSEA 03-2915, at 20 
(2003). 
89 Id. at 23. 
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refusing to provide ABA-type programs to children with ASDs.90  In Deal 
ex rel. Deal v Hamilton County Board of Education, Zachary was diagnosed 
with Autism by age three.91  In developing his first IEP, the school 
district did not include ABA therapy.  The district had previously 
developed and invested in an alternative approach to teaching students 
with Autism and denied the parents’ request for ABA therapy.  In 
rejecting the district’s determination, the court stated that IEPs should be 
based on the specific needs of the child, and that a school district cannot 
outright refuse to consider a specific method of treatment.92 
[T]he school district may not . . . decide that because it 
has spent a lot of money on a program, that program is 
always going to be appropriate for educating children 
with a specific disability, regardless of any evidence to the 
contrary of the individualized needs of a particular child.  A 
placement decision may only be considered to have been 
based on the child’s IEP when the child’s individual 
characteristics, including demonstrated response to 
particular types of educational programs, are taken into 
account.93 
Thus, even though schools are not required by the IDEA to 
maximize a disabled child’s educational benefit, they must still consider 
any and all programs that may help a particular child learn.  Schools 
cannot reject a program simply because it does not already exist at the 
school if it appears that this program will be the one most likely to help 
the child achieve educational gains.  This highlights a key factor for 
parents:  school districts are obligated to provide and, if necessary, 
develop programs for a child to achieve educational benefits.  Simply put, 
it is clear that school districts cannot have all-or-nothing policies; they 
cannot ban or only use ABA therapy.  Rather, school districts are 
required to make individualized determinations of appropriate services 
for each child.94 
The Tenth Circuit recently examined the outcomes that are required 
under the IEP.  In Thompson, an autistic student made progress in school 
but was not able to generalize his skills in daily life.95  The Tenth Circuit 
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 858 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
91 Id. at 845. 
92 Id. at 845-47. 
93 Id. at 859. 
94 Id. 
95 Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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held that generalization of skills across settings is not required by the 
IDEA.96  The requirement is only that the student be making some 
progress in school; the goal of self-sufficiency is not a guarantee.97  This 
case, like many other cases, demonstrates a lack of understanding of the 
nature of ASD as a social and behavioral disability; thus, some of the 
cases seem paradoxical given the nature of ASDs.  Courts have even 
imposed limits on what falls within the context of education for IDEA 
purposes, which contradicts the nature of challenges faced by students 
with ASD.98  For example, the U.S. District Court of New Mexico held 
that the IDEA only seeks to provide academic educational services and 
rejected social skills programming for a student.99  This focus on 
academic education reflects a belief that socializing is a beneficial, but 
incidental, by-product of public education; this is in conflict with the 
nature of the disability and even with the IDEA definition of Autism.100  
The IDEA specifically highlights social deficits as part of ASD.101  It 
seems illogical for a court to then hold that the IDEA does not require 
addressing these deficits in the IEP. 
There are some bright spots however.  States, of course, are free to 
increase the standards necessary for an IEP to provide a FAPE.  In 
Burilovich ex rel. Burilovich v. Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit noted 
that Michigan’s statute added to the federal FAPE mandates “by 
requiring that an IEP be designed to develop the ‘maximum potential’ of 
a child,” which would include a child with ASD.102  In determining 
whether a particular IEP met this increased standard, the court found 
that in a case where there was conflicting testimony as to the best 
program for the child, the school’s plan constituted a FAPE if the 
teaching method it proposed was appropriate for the child and allowed 
him to benefit.103 
                                                 
96 Id. at 1150. 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray ex rel. D.G., 611 F.3d 419, 426 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that the IDEA does not require an IEP to address behavior issues; a “good faith 
effort” is sufficient and all that is required to assist a student in meeting the educational 
goals set forth in the student’s IEP). 
99 Chavez v. Bd. of Educ., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1223–24 (D.N.M. 2009). 
100 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)) (defining 
autism under the IDEA). 
102 Burilovich ex rel. Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ., 208 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir 2000) (citing 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 380.170(a), 380.1711(17)(a), 380.1751(1) (West 1997)). 
103 Id. at 572. 
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D. Where Should the Child Be Placed?  The “Least Restrictive Environment” 
Requirement 
As part of a FAPE, the IDEA requires that students with disabilities 
be educated in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”).104  Failure to 
provide an education in the LRE is a substantive flaw in the IEP.105  This 
means that children with disabilities should be in a regular school setting 
or as close to a general education setting as possible.  For example, the 
District Court of Hawaii recently moved a thirteen-year-old autistic child 
from a private school, which he had attended for seven years, to a public 
school, emphasizing the intent of the IDEA that, to the maximum extent 
possible, children should be educated along with students who are not 
receiving special education services.106  However, different circuits have 
taken varying views on how to implement this requirement. 
In Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit developed a 
two-prong test.107  The first prong of the test assesses “whether education 
in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, 
can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child.  If it cannot, [courts 
should next ask] whether the school [practices inclusion] to the 
maximum extent appropriate.”108  It is only if a school meets these 
requirements that it has provided an education in the least restrictive 
environment to students with a disability.  The Daniel R.R. court 
emphasized that the “analysis is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry 
that requires [the court] to examine carefully the nature and severity of 
the child’s handicapping condition, his needs and abilities, and the 
schools’ response to the child’s needs.”109  Both the Second and Third 
Circuits have adopted identical tests.110 
In Roncker ex. rel. Roncker v. Walter, the Sixth Circuit created an 
analysis specifically for when a more restrictive facility should be 
                                                 
104 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006). 
105 E.G. ex rel. A.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
106 Laddie C. ex rel. Joshua C. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-00309 SOM/BMK, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25618, at *12–13 (D. Haw. March 27, 2009). 
107 Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). 
108 Id.  The court uses the phrase “mainstreamed,” but “inclusion” is the more 
appropriate term today. 
109 Id. 
110 See P. ex rel. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] 
court should consider, first, ‘whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of 
supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child,’ and, if not, 
then “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent 
appropriate.”); Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(adopting the test articulated in Daniel R.R.). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/1
2011] Engulfed by the Spectrum 431 
considered superior to the general education classroom.111  Under this 
test, the initial inquiry is “whether the services which make that 
placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated 
setting.  If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be 
inappropriate under the Act.”112  Ironically, this is a reversal of the tests 
used in other cases.  The Sixth Circuit prefers framing the issue in this 
way because it “accords the proper respect for the strong preference in 
favor of mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some 
handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated 
facilities.”113  The Eighth Circuit has adopted an almost identical test.114  
It is not hard to project that these rulings could result in more children 
with ASD in more restrictive settings, producing fewer opportunities for 
interaction with non-disabled peers.  Accordingly, several recent news 
articles have highlighted the growing number of children in isolated 
settings and the high cost of private programs.115 
In an administrative decision applying the Roncker analysis, the 
hearing officer found that the practice of “‘Reverse’ mainstreaming”—
bringing general education students into the special education classroom 
for some period of the day—does not in any way create a less restrictive 
environment for the special education students.116  It is only when the 
                                                 
111 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See Pachl ex rel. Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2006). 
115 See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Daniel de Vise, Court Weighs Funding for Special Education:  
Private-School Tuition at Heart of Case, WASHINGTON POST, April 27, 2009, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/26/AR2009042602249.html 
(providing examples of the rising costs of tuition for private programs). 
In Montgomery County, for example, private tuition expenses have 
risen from $21 million in fiscal 2000 to a projected $39 million in fiscal 
2010.  The Montgomery school system, which has a more 
comprehensive special-education department than many other 
systems, has 614 students attending private schools this year.  Fairfax 
County schools spent $15 million on tuition in the 2007–08 academic 
year . . . .  The system now has 233 students in private schools.  But 
others spend much more.  Prince George's County schools, with fewer 
services, this year spent $56 million on 1,168 students.  And the District 
[of Columbia], with a historically troubled special-education 
department, has 2,300 students receiving private care at a cost of $141 
million. 
Id.  See also Amanda M. Fairbanks, Tug of War over Cost to Educate the Autistic, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 19, 2009, at A28.  The Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee estimates the costs 
for addressing all of the needs of people with ASD as between $35-90 billion annually.  
IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
116 Mich. State Office Admin. Hearing & Rules, Dep’t of Educ. v. Allen Park Pub. Sch., 
SHE 06-77, 48 (May 1, 2007). 
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special education students are actually placed in the general education 
classroom that the placement can be considered less restrictive.117 
In Board of Education v. Ross ex rel. Ross, the Seventh Circuit explicitly 
refused “to adopt any sort of multi-factor test for assessing whether a 
child may remain in a regular school.”118  Rather, the court held that 
it is not enough to show that a student is obtaining some 
benefit, no matter how minimal, at the mainstream 
school in order to prove that the District's removal of [a 
student] violated the “least restrictive environment" 
requirement.  Instead, giving due deference to the 
administrative findings and the conclusions of the 
district court, we ask whether the education in the 
conventional school was satisfactory and, if not, whether 
reasonable measures would have made it so.119 
Thus, the inquiry under this analysis is whether the child was 
receiving—or could receive with reasonable modifications—a 
meaningful education in a general education classroom.  Only if the 
answer to this is no can the child be placed into a more restrictive 
environment. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit employs 
a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a 
district’s placement offered education in the [least 
restrictive environment]:  (1) the educational benefits of 
placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the 
nonacademic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect 
the student has on the teacher and other students in the 
regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming the 
student.120 
Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit found that benefits to be 
derived from a mainstream program were minimal and a special 
education program would better meet the child’s needs, which overcame 
the preference for mainstreaming or inclusion.121  In applying the same 
                                                 
117 See id. 
118 Bd. of Educ. v. Ross ex rel. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 (7th Cir. 2007). 
119 Id. 
120 B.S. ex rel. R.S. v. Placentia-Yorba Linda Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F. App’x 397, 399–400 
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14 
F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
121 Id. 
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test, the District Court of Nevada minimized the non-academic benefits, 
which the student would achieve during other parts of the day, and 
upheld the decision to provide math instruction in a special education 
classroom.122  The court relied on the lack of meaningful gains the 
student previously made in math.123  These conflicts in the circuits 
concerning placement have ramifications for all children, not only those 
with ASD.  Such confusion can have a chilling effect on school district 
development of least restrictive settings not only for children with ASD 
but also for all children with disabilities. 
E. Reimbursement:  Who Pays When Schools Do Not Comply with IDEA 
Requirements? 
Typically, school districts pay for all special education and related 
services dictated by an IEP utilizing IDEA and other federal, state, and 
local funds.  When a school district does not provide adequate services, 
parents may find private providers to provide appropriate services.124  
The private providers can be very expensive and the questions become:  
how do parents pay for private services?  If the school district is 
responsible, what must parents do in order to obtain reimbursement?  
Much of the recent litigation regarding appropriateness of the IEP, 
particularly for children with ASD, is focused on reimbursement of costs 
for private services. 
In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the 
Supreme Court declared that the IDEA authorizes reimbursement of 
parents for private special education services.125  Burlington addressed 
the education situation of Michael Panico, a student classified as 
“handicapped” within the meaning of the IDEA.126  The parents and the 
school disagreed over the source of Michael’s disabilities:  his parents 
believed that his difficulties were neurological while the school system 
believed it was an emotional disorder.127  A similar debate often takes 
place when determining services for students with ASD.  The district 
proposed placing Michael in a six-student classroom within the public 
school system; his parents rejected this proposal and placed him in a 
private, highly specialized school.128  The Supreme Court first noted that 
                                                 
122 Yates ex rel. Yates v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 03:07-CV-00200-LRH-RJJ, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 68937, at *13–16 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2008), aff’d 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46970 (D. 
Nev. May 20, 2009). 
123 Id. at *13. 
124 Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 361. 
127 Id. at 362. 
128 Id. 
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a child who meets the criteria of the IDEA is entitled to receive an 
appropriate education at public expense.129  The Court then held that the 
IDEA authorizes reimbursement of parents for expenditures for private 
special education if the court determines that the private placement, 
rather than the placement proposed in the IEP, is appropriate.130  Thus, 
this decision establishes the right of parents in certain circumstances to 
obtain reimbursement of the costs of private special education and 
related services. 
In Winkelman v. Parma City School District, the United States Supreme 
Court determined that the IDEA grants rights to parents as well as 
children.131  The Court disagreed “that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s 
involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights.”132  
Because parents have their own rights under the IDEA, they are entitled 
to bring IDEA claims representing their own rights, rather than those of 
their children, without an attorney.133  This case reinforces parents’ rights 
to seek reimbursement of the costs of private services. 
Reimbursement can be appropriate even when parents move a child 
to a private placement without consent from school authorities, though it 
is at their own risk.  If the court finds that the proposed IEP placement 
was appropriate, a district will not have to reimburse the parents.134  This 
situation is problematic, however, because it gives an enormous 
advantage to wealthy families who can afford to take the risk of paying 
for private programs without a guarantee of reimbursement.  The 
reimbursement cases are another example of how ASD cases have 
reshaped case law for all under the IDEA, though it creates a troubling 
dilemma.  On the one hand, courts do not want to delay students 
receiving services—even if private; on the other hand, public school 
systems must retain their obligation to develop timely appropriate 
services.  There is a process that courts should follow to ensure that the 
laws do not favor wealthier families.  Thus, in a reimbursement suit, the 
appropriate inquiry consists of three questions:  (1) determining whether 
the IEP offered by the school district was appropriate; (2) determining 
whether the private placement was appropriate; and (3) determining 
whether equitable considerations support reimbursement.135  The Fifth 
Circuit recently followed the guidelines of Burlington, reiterating that 
                                                 
129 Id. at 361. 
130 Id. at 370. 
131 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 527 (2007). 
132 Id. at 528–29. 
133 Id. at 535. 
134 Id. at 531–32; see also Burlington, 471 U.S. 359. 
135 See N.R. ex rel. T.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07 Cv. 9648 (BSJ), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27273, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2009) (interpreting Burlington, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)). 
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reimbursement is appropriate upon a finding of a failure to provide a 
FAPE available in a timely manner, prior to placement in a private 
setting.136  The Second Circuit elaborated on how to determine if the IEP 
was appropriate:  courts are to (1) examine whether the state has 
complied with IDEA procedures in developing the IEP; and (2) consider 
whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.”137  Only if the court finds procedural or 
substantive violations of the IDEA should the court evaluate whether the 
private placement obtained by the parent is appropriate for the child’s 
needs.138 
The substantive requirements focus on whether the services 
provided or offered to the child comply with the IDEA requirements—
whether the child will receive educational benefit.139  The procedural 
requirements, however, are more technical and easier to identify, and 
errors are quite common.  Procedural requirements ensure that diagnosis 
and service determinations are made in a timely fashion with the most 
information and participation possible, and they ensure that parents 
have clear routes to appeal any service decisions.140  As procedural 
requirements serve as a safeguard for parents, a pro-compliance stance is 
critical.  Courts, however, have taken varying approaches to technical 
violations of the IDEA.  The Ninth Circuit has held that while technical 
violations do not automatically render an IEP invalid, violations “that 
result in the loss of educational opportunity” are to be taken seriously 
and are a violation of the right to a FAPE.141  Thus, major procedural 
violations render an IEP invalid.  For example, referring parents to a 
private Autism center (even when the parents never obtained services 
from that center), rather than actually providing an evaluation, was a 
violation that denied the student a FAPE.142  The Sixth Circuit has taken 
a similar position, holding that procedural violations of IDEA only 
amount to denial of a FAPE where they result in substantive harm.143 
                                                 
136 Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 2009). 
137 T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982)). 
138 Id. 
139 See supra Part III.C (discussing substantive educational benefit requirements). 
140 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (outlining procedural safeguards under the IDEA); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205−07 (1982); N.B. ex rel. C.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. 
Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207−08 (9th Cir. 2008). 
141 N.B. ex rel. C.B., 541 F.3d at 1207. 
142 Id. at 1209. 
143 See Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] procedural violation of the IDEA is not a per se denial of a FAPE; rather, a school 
district’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act will constitute a 
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Sometimes, however, courts will override more trivial procedural 
violations in favor of the school districts.  The Ninth Circuit held that 
certain procedural violations, such as not including the student’s private 
school teacher in the IEP meetings or not incorporating all of the goals 
suggested by a private provider, would not undermine the IEP validity 
and did not deprive the student of educational opportunities.144  The IEP 
was still tailored to meet the student’s unique needs and would provide 
some educational benefits.145  Similarly, the Northern District of Illinois 
adopted the Sixth Circuit position that technical compliance with all 
procedural requirements is not required; so long as parents have not 
suffered prejudice, substantial compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 is 
sufficient.146  The Second Circuit held that failure to conduct a behavioral 
assessment was not enough to find a lack of a FAPE.147 
The Tenth Circuit recently adopted the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ 
position that a parent not participating meaningfully in the IEP 
development process is not a procedural violation of the IDEA that 
denies a student an educational opportunity.148  Additionally, the 
District Court in Arizona has held that the IDEA does not require an 
Autism expert to be part of the IEP team, based on the difficulty of 
identifying an Autism expert.149  The court held that the provision of a 
general, qualified special education teacher was sufficient.150  The 
troubling nature of these cases cannot be underestimated.  Such 
decisions would have been unheard of a decade ago, but today with the 
proliferation of cases, particularly involving ASD, and the recent placing 
of the burden of proof on parents,151 some courts are taking a more lax 
approach to procedural violations. 
                                                                                                             
denial of a FAPE only if such violation causes substantive harm to the child or his 
parents.”). 
144 Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F. App’x 692, 695 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
145 Id. 
146 Richard Paul E. v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 202, No. 07 C 6911, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29833, at *42–43 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2009). 
147 A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 2009). 
148 Systema ex rel. Systema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1314 (10th Cir. 2008).  
Courts may be particularly hesitant to find that a procedural violation rises to the level of 
denial of a FAPE where parents are uncooperative.  See, e.g., C.H. ex rel. Hayes v. Cape 
Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 69 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e decline to hold that a school 
district is liable for procedural violations that are thrust upon it by uncooperative 
parents.”). 
149 Parenteau ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 07-8072-PCT-NVW, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104465, at *23–24 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2008). 
150 Id. 
151 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). 
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After examining substantive and procedural IDEA compliance, 
courts examine the private placements that warrant reimbursement.  
Once it has been determined that the IEP is insufficient, courts have been 
flexible in accepting various placements by parents.  Significantly, in 
Richardson Independent School District v. Michael Z., the Fifth Circuit held 
that reimbursement is not limited to placement by a parent in a purely 
private setting; the same standard should apply if the placement chosen 
by a parent has both private and public components.152  After evaluating 
the IEP under Supreme Court guidelines, the court turned to whether the 
private placement was appropriate.  Rather than ban placement in any 
non-private setting, the court adopted the following test:  “In order for a 
residential placement to be appropriate under IDEA, the placement must 
be 1) essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful 
educational benefit, and 2) primarily oriented toward enabling the child 
to obtain an education.”153  The District Court for the Central District of 
California came to a similar decision in holding that the distinction 
between a nonpublic school and nonpublic agency is immaterial to 
reimbursement in light of the purposes of the IDEA.154 
Finally, in evaluating reimbursement claims, courts emphasize 
equitable considerations in determining if the private placement is 
appropriate for the child’s needs but note that parents bear the burden of 
persuasion.155  Emphasizing equitable considerations from Burlington, 
the Southern District of New York addressed a parent’s placement of her 
autistic child in the Rebecca School, which can cost over $72,000 per year 
in tuition alone.156  The district conceded that the IEP was not 
appropriate.157  The court then evaluated equitable considerations, 
holding that where parents notify the school district of their 
dissatisfaction and do not frustrate the district’s efforts to place the child 
in an appropriate setting, equitable considerations allow for 
reimbursement.158  The equitable considerations seem to focus a great 
deal on the behavior of parents through the IEP conflict.  If parents have 
                                                 
152 See 580 F.3d 286, 295−96 (5th Cir. 2009) (awarding reimbursement for fees associated 
with the private Texas Neurological Rehabilitation Center where the student attended an 
on-site, public charter school). 
153 Id. at 299. 
154 C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1100 
(S.D. Cal. 2009). 
155 See, e.g., T.P. ex rel. S.P. v Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
156 N.R. ex rel. T.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07 CV 9648 (BSJ), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27273 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009); Alyssa Katz, The Autism Clause, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2006, 
http://nymag.com/news/features/23172/. 
157 N.R. ex rel. T.R., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27273, at *10. 
158 Id. at *17–20. 
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participated in the process, rather than making it impossible for the 
district to offer appropriate placements, equitable considerations will 
tend toward reimbursement; if the parents have refused to participate or 
cooperate with the school district, equity tends to disfavor 
reimbursement. 
F. Early Intervention Case Law 
Early identification of ASDs is critical to the most effective 
management of ASDs and optimal outcomes for children.  The American 
Academy of Pediatrics (”AAP”) recently issued a report recommending 
that all pediatricians screen every child in their care for signs of ASD at 9, 
18, and either 24 or 36 months.159  The AAP developed a screening and 
surveillance algorithm to assist primary care physicians in the 
identification process.160  These screenings will facilitate earlier referrals 
to the Early Intervention program.  Children suspected of having a delay 
or being at risk of a delay or developmental disorder such as Autism will 
be referred for services.161  Arguably, children diagnosed with ASD by a 
pediatrician or other physician should qualify for Early Intervention 
services as children with “a diagnosed physical or mental condition that 
has a high probability of resulting in developmental delay” under Part C 
of the IDEA.162  Otherwise, children will qualify under the broader 
standards encompassing children “under 3 years of age who need[] early 
intervention services because the individual is experiencing 
developmental delays, as measured by appropriate diagnostic 
instruments and procedures in 1 or more of the areas of cognitive 
development, physical development, communication development, 
social or emotional development, and adaptive development.”163 
The IDEA makes funds available to states that provide “appropriate 
early intervention services . . . to all infants and toddlers with disabilities 
in the State and their families.”164  This represents a two generational 
service system in that it provides services to both children and their 
                                                 
159 Chris Plauché Johnson, Scott M. Myers & Council on Children with Disabilities, 
Identification and Evaluation of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 120 PEDIATRICS 1183, 
1195 (2007). 
160 Id.  The report argues that given the prevalence of ASDs, every pediatrician will 
inevitably treat multiple children with ASDs.  Id. at 1184.  Pediatricians must understand 
the clinical signs of early ASD and understand the importance of early diagnosis and 
intervention.  Id. 
161 Id. at 1196. 
162 20 U.S.C. § 1432(5)(A)(ii) (2006).  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1431–1445 (2006) (pertaining 
to infants and toddlers with disabilities). 
163 20 U.S.C. § 1432(5)(A)(i) (statutory numbering omitted). 
164 Id. § 1434. 
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families.  Typically, after a multidisciplinary evaluation, parents, 
evaluators, early intervention officials, and others meet to develop an 
Individualized Family Service Plan (“IFSP”).165  The IFSP includes a 
current assessment of the child, goals for progress, and implementation 
strategies, including delineation of services to the child and the parent 
(such as parent training or parent counseling) and the environment in 
which the child will receive services.166 
Part C of the IDEA requires that a state provide early intervention 
services to infants and children with disabilities from birth to age three 
in order to receive financial assistance from the federal government.167  
After the third birthday, states are required to provide a FAPE to 
students with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one years 
old in order to receive funds under Part B of the IDEA.168 
1. Early Intervention Services 
Service requirements for early intervention reflect similar principles 
as those applied in Part B (IDEA), IEP cases.  In A.G. ex rel. N.G. v. 
Frieden, a child was diagnosed with Autism when he was twenty months 
old.169  He was initially diagnosed as autistic by both a private 
pediatrician and a New York City Early Intervention Program 
provider.170  The evaluation provided by the City’s contractor included 
psychological, developmental, speech/language, and occupational 
therapy evaluations, but did not include service recommendations.171  In 
developing the IFSP, the Early Intervention officials proposed twenty 
hours of ABA therapy and a variety of other services; the parents wanted 
more ABA therapy.172  In determining that the proposed level of ABA 
therapy was sufficient, the court reiterated many of the principles from 
IEP cases:  substantial compliance with procedural requirements is 
sufficient and the substantive requirement does not require maximizing 
potential or providing the best services.173  Accordingly, the judge noted 
that while the parent’s witnesses testified that more than twenty hours of 
ABA therapy (the proposed amount) was desirable, none testified that 
                                                 
165 Id. § 1436(a). 
166 Id. § 1436(d). 
167 See generally id. § 1435 (describing requirements of state systems serving infants and 
toddlers with disabilities). 
168 See supra Part III.C (discussing the range of substantive entitlements under Part B). 
169 A.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Frieden, No. 08 Civ. 1576 (LAK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24887, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009). 
170 Id. at *7–8. 
171 Id. at *8. 
172 Id. at *12–13. 
173 Id. at *18. 
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twenty hours would produce only trivial benefits.174  Indeed, as 
previously stated, there is a paucity of research on the intensity of 
services.175 
In a letter responding to an inquiry on whether parents of a two-
year-old autistic child can insist on an out-of-network placement if they 
have demonstrated evidence that ABA has improved their child’s 
development and their local Part C provider does not provide ABA 
therapy, the United States Department of Education, Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitative Services clarified that the IFSP Team, 
which includes the child’s parents, makes an individualized 
determination of whether a particular method of providing services is 
needed for a child to achieve the outcomes in the child’s IFSP.176  
Evidence from the parents alone is insufficient to determine what 
method will be most successful to help the child receive the desired 
outcome.177  Thus, the inquiry remains individualized.  Although a child 
is not entitled to ABA services just because those services have proven 
effective for the child in the past, the case law still emphasizes that an 
absolute bar on a particular therapy violates the IDEA.178  The District 
Court of Arizona followed this line of reasoning, holding that the district 
was not required to provide a particular type of service so long as it 
employed qualified professionals who made IEP decisions based on the 
child’s needs.179 
As in Part B, there is no set policy on the number of hours of ABA 
therapy a child should or can receive, nor is there research on this 
important point.180  B.D. v. Debuono, while remanded for fact-finding, 
noted that a district’s categorical limit on the number of hours of ABA 
therapy a child could receive, even if a de facto practice and not a formal 
                                                 
174 Id. at *42. 
175 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
176 Letter from Patricia J. Guard, Acting Dir., Office of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative 
Servs., to [redacted] (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.ideainfanttoddler.org/pdf/ 
Redacted_9-07.pdf. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 855–60 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
179 Parenteau ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 07-8072-PCT-NVW, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104465, at *22–25 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2008). 
180 See, e.g., IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23–25 (noting that there is little 
scientific evidence to support the efficacy of many programs currently in use; the document 
notes that ABA and other behavior therapies have been studied most extensively but calls 
for effective interventions based on modern research and rigorous studies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of many of the treatment options available). 
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regulation, would constitute a violation of the property interest 
grounded in the IDEA.181 
Parents are entitled to reimbursement when services are reduced or 
changed for reasons not related to the child’s needs; parents are not 
entitled to reimbursement simply because they believe the student 
would benefit from additional or different services.  In Adams ex rel. 
Adams v. Oregon, parents enrolled their son in Early Intervention 
Services.182  The parents eventually challenged whether the services 
provided were sufficient under the IDEA.  In evaluating the IFSP, the 
court cited IEP cases, much like the court in A.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Frieden, 
reiterating that an appropriate intervention program does not mean the 
absolute best services or potential maximization for the child.183  
Rejecting the lower court’s assertion that it is impossible to tell if the IFSP 
provided the child with a meaningful benefit because of the 
supplemental private services, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 
question is whether the IFSP was appropriately designed and 
implemented so as to convey a meaningful benefit—the “reasonably 
calculated” standard.184  Thus, the court concluded that the IEP was 
appropriate because it was based on careful research and literature.185 
2. Early Intervention Reimbursement 
Much like in Part B, reimbursement has become a major issue in Part 
C litigation.  Case law addressing IEP violations of the IDEA have been 
used to evaluate IFSP violation claims.  In Frieden, the court evaluated 
the IFSP using IEP case law after the parties effectively stipulated to the 
applicability.186  Thus, the court conducted the same three-step inquiry 
that is used in IEP claims:  1) whether there was procedural compliance 
with the IDEA; 2) whether there was substantive compliance with the 
IDEA; and 3) whether the private program was appropriate for the 
child’s needs.187  Again, only substantial procedural compliance is 
required, and there is no requirement that optimal services be provided.  
There is no requirement of maximization of a child’s potential.188 
                                                 
181 B.D. v. DeBuono, 130 F. Supp. 2d 401, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
182 195 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999). 
183 Id. at 1149. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 No. 08 Civ. 1576 (LAK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24887, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 
2009). 
187 Id. at *17–18. 
188 Id. at *18. 
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In evaluating a challenge to the appropriateness of an IFSP, Part B 
principles were also applied by the District Court of Maryland in Wagner 
v. Short.189  Although Part B focuses on educational benefits and Part C 
focuses on enhancing developmental needs, the “basic structure” of the 
two programs is very similar.190  In Wagner, a child and his parents filed 
suit against the county’s infants and toddlers program for violation of 
the IDEA.191  In an administrative hearing, the IFSP was found to be 
adequate, and the parents challenged that decision.192  The district court 
has broad authority to order compensatory services for past deprivations 
resulting from IDEA violations; the IDEA also allows courts to grant 
compensatory services to children who are beyond the statutory age.193  
This is significant because it prevents cases from being thrown out as 
moot where the child is beyond the age of eligibility.194 
In Malkentzos v. DeBuono, parents sought early intervention services 
for their son, who was diagnosed with ASD when he was approximately 
eighteen months old. 195  Following several evaluations, it was 
recommended that the child be enrolled in twenty hours of ABA therapy 
each week.  The service provider to which the family was referred did 
not provide ABA therapy, and the child was too young for another state-
certified program.196  The director of one of the programs assisted the 
family in structuring an in-home ABA therapy program, which included 
hiring college students who were not state-certified in ABA.197  After the 
child made progress with ABA therapy, the father requested that the 
IFSP be modified to provide forty hours of ABA therapy.198  The request 
was denied because there was a shortage of providers; the father 
continued to employ the college students.199  The IFSP was modified to 
                                                 
189 Wagner v. Short, 63 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (D. Md. 1999). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 675. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 676–77. 
194 This principle has also been applied in Part B cases.  See, e.g., Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of 
Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the IDEA allows courts to grant 
compensatory education services to plaintiffs who establish that they did not receive the 
education services to which they were entitled while under the statutory age); Lester H. ex 
rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990).  Recently, the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that financial compensation was not sufficient when a student 
passed the age of eligibility but had not received appropriate educational services; the 
school district was required to provide all elements of a FAPE, rather than merely financial 
compensation.  Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 719–20 (3d Cir. 2010). 
195 102 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1996). 
196 Id. at 52. 
197 Id. 
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 52–53. 
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provide eight and a half hours of ABA each week.200  In Malkentzos and a 
related case, Still v. DeBuono, the courts held that private providers do 
not have to be certified when a parent uses their services because the 
IFSP was insufficient due to a provider shortage.201  This lowering of the 
standards for qualified professionals is another example of the negative 
potential of ASD litigation for all children with disabilities; the windfall 
from such decisions has yet to be fully realized. 
3. Transition from Part C to Part B 
The transition from Part C to Part B has been an issue of recent 
litigation.  There is a conflict in the circuits on whether the “stay put” 
provision of the IDEA, which entitles students to stay in the prior setting 
during any appeal, applies to this transition period.202  This is a critical 
issue because it enables the child to receive ongoing services during the 
pendency of an appeal. 
In M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. New York City Department of Education, the 
child began receiving early intervention services around her second 
birthday.203  Under her IFSP, she received thirty hours per week of ABA 
therapy, parent training, two hours per week of occupational therapy, 
five hours per week of speech, and two hours of physical therapy each 
week.204  Several months before the child’s third birthday, the New York 
Department of Education’s Committee on Pre-School Education was 
notified of A.M.’s potential eligibility and the evaluation process 
began.205  The mother and the district could not agree on an IEP and the 
mother placed the child in a private setting.206  The mother sought a due 
process hearing and continuation of the services provided under the 
IFSP during the pendency of the due process hearings, but she was 
denied.  The A.M. court held that the IDEA does not entitle a child to 
pendency placement at the level of services received under the IFSP 
during a dispute over the transition from Part C to Part B.207  According 
to the A.M. court, this pendency right only applies once a child has 
previously received services in the public school system.208  This decision 
                                                 
200 Id. at 53. 
201 Id. at 54; Still v. DeBuono, 101 F.3d 888, 893 (2d Cir. 1996).  Malkentos was remanded 
on appeal due to standards for granting injunctive relief.  102 F.3d at 54–56. 
202 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006) (“[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings . . . the child 
shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child . . . .”). 
203 583 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 501–02. 
207 Id. at 510–13. 
208 Id. at 512–13. 
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once again underscores the legal ramification for all children with 
disabilities from the proliferation of ASD litigation.  In contrast, in 
Pardini ex rel. Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, the Third Circuit, 
relying on the provision that the transition be “smooth,”209 held that the 
pendency provision applied in due process hearings during transition.210  
Pardini shows that well-planned litigation can reap benefits for all 
children, while A.M. stands for the unexpected outcomes of ASD 
litigation that can affect all children with disabilities. 
In D.P. ex rel. E.P v. School Board, much like in A.M., the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected Pardini and held that the IDEA does not entitle plaintiffs 
to continue receiving services pursuant to their IFSP while the IEP is 
finalized.211  In this case, three autistic triplets were denied continuation 
of IFSP services until the IEPs were in place.212  Interestingly, the parents 
were not without remedy if they could prove that the district failed to 
provide a FAPE, entitling them to reimbursement.213  However, the 
school district did not have a duty to simply continue IFSP services 
before the IEP was in place.  Like the A.M. court, the Eleventh Circuit 
based its decision on the perceived statutory language, finding that the 
stay-put provision does not apply when a child is applying for initial 
admission, although virtually all other procedural safeguards from Part 
B have been applied over and over by courts.214  The issue of the 
applicability of the stay-put provision to Part C is a worthy subject for 
the 2011 reauthorization of the IDEA.215 
G. Vaccine Litigation  
The potential link between early childhood vaccinations and Autism 
has been the subject of a large body of litigation and research.  Parents’ 
exclusive recourse if they believe a vaccine caused Autism is to file a 
complaint under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (“Vaccine 
Act”).216  Over 5,300 cases have been filed alleging that a vaccine caused 
                                                 
209 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(9) (2006) (discussing the requirement that children in early 
intervention programs experience a “smooth and effective transition” to specific preschool 
programs). 
210 Pardini ex rel. Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 185–92 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
211 483 F.3d 725, 729–30 (11th Cir. 2007). 
212 Id. at 727. 
213 Id. at 730 n.1. 
214 Id. at 729–31; M.M. ex rel. A.M.. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 
(S.D.N.Y 2008). 
215 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 
118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482; 9567–9567b). 
216 Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa).  The 
vaccine that is most often associated with Autism is the MMR vaccine (Measles, Mumps, 
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ASD.  This massive body of litigation has been assigned to a Special 
Master and has revolved around two issues.  Most significantly, is there 
a causal connection between vaccination—particularly the measles, 
mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine—and Autism?  The second issue 
raised by these cases concerns the statute of limitations.  The federal 
vaccine statute requires that the injury be reported or the case filed 
within three years from the date of the occurrence of the first 
symptom.217  This creates a challenge for families with children with 
Autism because ASDs tend to have a slow onset with no definite 
appearance of first symptoms.218  Despite all these questions, the vaccine 
controversy has used millions of research dollars.  It was largely put to 
rest in early 2009 when a Special Master ruled that three plaintiff families 
with children with ASD failed to prove a link between vaccines and 
ASD.219 
Additionally, in 2010 the Lancet retracted an oft-cited 1998 paper—
the only research showing a link between vaccines and Autism.220  The 
Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee developed a Strategic Plan 
for future research relating to Autism.  While it calls for continued 
cooperation with the National Vaccine Advisory Committee and 
                                                                                                             
and Rubella), which is administered around the age of one and then again before starting 
school.  See generally Helia Garrido Hull, Induced Autism:  The Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Inoculating Vaccine Manufacturers from Liability, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing 
compulsory vaccinations, increased prevalence of Autism, and the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program); Katherine Marie Bulfer, Comment, Childhood Vaccinations and 
Autism:  Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Leave Parents of Children with Autism 
Out in the Cold with Nowhere to Go?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91 (2004) (analyzing the 
implications of the National Vaccine Injury Act for parents); Gordon Shemin, Comment, 
Mercury Rising:  The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and What Families Should Know Before 
Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 459 (2008) (proposing improvements to the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act); Bartholomew C. Wacek, Comment, Taking 
Sides in the Vaccine/Autism Legal Battle, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 305 (2004) (analyzing 
the legal issues in state and federal vaccine litigation). 
217 See Bulfer, supra note 216. 
218 See IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 7. 
219 Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 706, 745–46 (Aug. 
11, 2009); see also Thomas H. Maugh II & Andrew Zajac, ‘Vaccines Court' Rejects Mercury-
Autism Link in 3 Test Cases, L.A. TIMES, March 13, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
mar/13/science/la-sci-autism13-2010mar13. 
220 Retraction—Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder in Children, THE LANCET (Feb. 2, 2010), http://download. 
thelancet.com/flatcontentassets/pdfs/S0140673610601754.pdf; see also Scott Hensley, 
Lancet Renounces Study Linking Autism and Vaccines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 2, 2010, 12:25 
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/lancet_wakefield_Autism_mr_au.html 
(announcing the retraction). 
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monitoring of potential links, it does not identify a need for more 
research on the causal connection between vaccinations and Autism.221 
IV.  LEGISLATION 
A. Federal 
1. Federal Hurdles 
As discussed in the introduction, there have been strides in 
recognizing Autism in federal laws.222  However, despite these advances, 
some laws and regulations potentially pose an obstacle for children with 
high functioning Autism.  Children with high functioning Autism may 
be academically equal or superior to their peers, yet may still have 
significant problems with social interaction.223  In 2006, the Department 
of Education developed regulations augmenting prior regulations to 
assist in implementing the IDEA.224  The regulations define Autism as “a 
developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal 
communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 
three, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.”225  The 
regulations further state that if a disabled child needs only related 
services but not special education services, she is not considered a child 
with a disability, and therefore is not necessarily entitled to free related 
services.226  The regulation qualifies this by saying that if the related 
services a child needs are considered special education services under 
state standards, the child will still be considered a child with a disability 
for the purposes of the IDEA.227  Under this federal regulation, unless a 
state provides that training in social interaction is a special education 
service, rather than a related service, a high-functioning autistic child 
may not get the services he or she desperately needs.  The Federal No 
Child Left Behind Act, with its focus on standardized testing and 
alternative testing for students with disabilities, does not accurately 
                                                 
221 See IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5 (discussing future research related to Autism 
but not mentioning vaccine research); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Court Says Vaccine Not 
to Blame for Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/ 
health/13vaccine.html. 
222 Supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
223  Lord & Bishop, supra note 8, at 4 (“Social impairments are characterized by lack of 
social-emotional reciprocity, failure to seek to share enjoyment, poor use of nonverbal 
communication, and difficulty in peer relations.”). 
224 34 C.F.R. § 300 (2006). 
225 Id. § 300.8(c)(1)(i) (2007). 
226 Id. § 300.8(a)(2)(i). 
227 Id. § 300.8(a)(2)(ii). 
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measure the progress of students with ASDs, particularly those students 
with social deficits.228  Several pieces of legislation that would have been 
helpful to individuals with Autism were not passed during the 111th 
Congress, and their future remains uncertain.229  The Combating Autism 
Act of 2006 provides federal grant money for ASD research and 
establishing Centers of Excellence for Autism epidemiology.230   
2. Health Care Reform 
The 2010 health care reform legislation signed by President Obama 
on March 23, 2010, is of great significance to children and adults with 
ASD.  Perhaps most importantly, insurance companies will be prohibited 
from denying coverage to children with pre-existing conditions such as 
ASD.  This applies to children immediately and will apply to adults in 
2014.231  Eventually, insurance companies will also be prohibited from 
charging consumers different prices based on demographic or health 
status.  The bill’s coverage of behavioral health treatments on the list of 
essential benefits is critical to families facing the challenges of a child 
with ASD and is a step in the right direction.  However, even in 2014, not 
all insurance companies will be required to cover the entire list of 
essential benefits and existing coverage, including plans offered in the 
large group market outside exchanges, and self-insured plans, also 
known as ERISA plans, will not be required to provide the essential 
                                                 
228 No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).  See Shima Kalaei, 
Note, Students with Autism Left Behind:  No Child Left Behind and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Act, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 723, 725 (2008) (stating that autistic children are not 
adequately protected by the educational standards imposed by the No Child Left Behind 
Act (“NCLB”) because the act allows for alternative assessments for students with 
disabilities).  The Note argues that these alternative assessments do not accurately portray 
students’ progress.  Id. at 733–37.  Even more troubling, the Note states that focusing on 
these inadequate academic assessments especially harms autistic children by taking the 
focus away from teaching them the functional, developmental, and social skills they so 
desperately need.  Although instruction in these important life skills are provided for in the 
IEP, they are considered irrelevant for meeting NCLB standards, so teachers end up not 
focusing on them.  Id. at 738–40.  The Note proposes that Congress amend NCLB so 
children with Autism can be evaluated based on their proficiency in meeting IEP goals 
rather than evaluating these students with meaningless modified assessment techniques.  
Id. at 744–47. 
229  See, e.g., The Autism Treatment Acceleration Act of 2009, H.R. 2413, 111th Cong. 
(2009); S. 819, 111th Cong. (2009) (mandating the establishment of an Autism Care Center 
Program); Helping HANDS for Autism Act, H.R. 1707, 111th Cong. (2009); S.B. 706, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (focusing on a wide range of services for adults); Combating Autism Act of 
2006. 
230 42 U.S.C. §§ 280i to 280i-4, 283j (2006). 
231 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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benefits package.232  Thus, behavioral health treatments such as ABA or 
the new ESDM might not be included in some plans.  Therefore, the 
activities of individual states remain critically important in defining 
essential benefits and requiring coverage of a wide range of services for 
children and adults with ASDs. 
B. State Legislation 
States have enacted a number of laws related to children with ASDs.  
New York and New Jersey, for example, have enacted statutes to address 
systemic issues concerning ASDs.  One recently enacted New York law 
directs the Commissioner of Health to establish a program for use by 
pediatricians for the early screening of children for ASDs.233  The law 
provides that these programs must require children to be screened at 
regular intervals during their critical developmental stage and that any 
child diagnosed with Autism must be referred to appropriate 
intervention services.234  The law provides for incorporation of the 
guidelines from the AAP.235  A recent New Jersey statute places the 
burden of proof and the burden of production in IDEA cases on the 
school district, overturning a recent Supreme Court decision.236  Under 
Schaffer, states can determine the burden of proof in IDEA cases and can 
shift the burden back to school districts, which enhances the rights of 
parents.237 
1. Insurance Legislation 
A growing number of states have enacted statutes to ensure that 
insurance companies cover necessary diagnosis and treatment of ASD.  
As of early 2010, approximately twenty-three states had enacted autism 
insurance reform laws.238  Insurance companies frequently reject claims 
for these treatments by alleging that they are experimental or that the 
costs are associated with special education and are therefore not medical 
                                                 
232 See U.S. House Passes Health Care Reform Bill Containing Provision for Autism Insurance 
Reform, AUTISM VOTES, (March 22, 2010), http://www.autismvotes.org/site/apps/nlnet/ 
content2.aspx?c=frKNI3PCImE&b=3930723&ct=8107177. 
233 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-j (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
234 Id. § 2500-j(1)(a). 
235 Id. § 2500-j(1). 
236 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West Supp. 2010). 
237 See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (placing the burden of proof on parents in 
IDEA cases). 
238 Autism Speaks State Autism Insurance Reform Initiatives, AUTISM VOTES, 
http://www.autismvotes.org/site/c.frKNI3PCImE/b.3909861/k.B9DF/State_Initiatives.ht
m (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). 
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treatment expenses that should be covered by insurance.  New Jersey 
recently enacted a law addressing this problem by mandating coverage 
of behavioral therapy and other treatments for children with Autism.239  
The New Jersey law also explicitly states that services cannot be denied 
because the services are educational and not medically restorative, which 
is an important issue in insurance law.240 
While states are passing such laws, many contain age restrictions or 
insurance caps that limit the applicability of these anti-discrimination 
insurance laws.  All too often adults with ASDs are not covered.  It is 
interesting to note that while most new state laws cover children, most of 
those children would be eligible for services under the IDEA and may 
not need as much protection as adults with ASDs.  Thus, the 
effectiveness of laws with such limits is still unclear, given the large 
group that remains uncovered.  New York law directs insurance 
companies not to exclude coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of 
ASDs.241  A bill passed by committees of the New York State Senate and 
Assembly would require all insurance companies to cover evidence-
based, clinically proven Autism therapies without any age limitation or 
caps.242 
Massachusetts,243 New Jersey,244 and Colorado245 have enacted 
similar statutes.  The Colorado statute includes ABA therapy among the 
treatments that must be covered and prohibits denial of coverage under 
most conditions.246  Texas requires health insurance plans to cover ASD, 
but only from diagnosis to nine years of age.247 
Illinois recently amended its insurance statute to require insurance 
companies to cover the diagnosis and treatment of Autism for children 
twenty-one years of age and younger.248  However, the law limits the 
required coverage to $36,000 per year.249  The statute defines ASDs as 
“pervasive developmental disorders as defined in the most recent 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
                                                 
239 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6ii (West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
240 Id. § 17:48-6ii(b). 
241 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(25) (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
242 S.B. 7000B, 2010 (N.Y., 2010).  On October 8, 2010, the bill was delivered to the 
Governor for his signature.  S07000 Actions, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY (Oct. 17, 2010), 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S07000%09%09&Summary=Y&Action
s=Y. 
243 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 2010). 
244 N.J. STAT. ANN. 17B:27-46.1v (West 2006). 
245 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-104.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
246 Id. § 10-16-104 (1.4)(XII). 
247 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 1355.015 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010). 
248 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.14 (Westlaw through P.A. 96-1485 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
249 Id. at 356z.14(b). 
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including autism, Asperger’s disorder, and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified.”250  Kansas also relies on the DSM-IV to 
require coverage under any group insurance policy or contract that 
provides medical, surgical, or hospital coverage.251 
South Carolina adopted a definition for ASDs identical to that of 
Illinois.252  However, its insurance coverage requirements differ from 
Illinois’s requirements.  To be eligible for insurance coverage, a child 
must have been diagnosed with an ASD by age eight.253  Also, the statute 
only provides coverage for a child until he or she reaches age sixteen.254  
The statute caps coverage at $50,000 and limits eligible treatments to 
those prescribed by the treating doctor.255 
Maine takes a slightly different approach to defining Autism than 
Illinois or South Carolina by defining it as “a developmental disorder 
characterized by a lack of responsiveness to other people, gross 
impairment in communicative skills and unusual responses to various 
aspects of the environment, all usually developing within the first 30 
months of age.”256  It then goes on to define an adult with Autism as 
someone whose diagnosis falls within the category of Pervasive 
Development Disorders under the DSM-IV and who “[h]as been 
assessed as having an adaptive behavior score at a level of functional 
impairment as determined by the [Department of Health and Human 
Services].”257 
Connecticut requires insurance coverage for ASD therapies, uses the 
DSM-IV definition of Autism, and defines behavioral therapy as “any 
interactive behavioral therapies derived from evidence-based research, 
including . . . [ABA],”258 but only children under fifteen years of age are 
entitled to these therapies and they must be provided by a licensed 
provider.259  However, the law allows the insurance company to limit 
coverage for behavior therapy to $50,000 for a child less than nine years 
of age, $35,000 for a child between nine and thirteen years of age, and 
$25,000 for a child between thirteen and fifteen years of age.260  Also, the 
statute states that a diagnosis should not be valid for less than twelve 
                                                 
250 Id. at 356z.14(i). 
251 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,105 (Supp. 2009). 
252 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280(A)(1) (Supp. 2009). 
253 Id. § 38-71-280(E). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. § 38-71-280(D), (E). 
256 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 6002(1) (2010). 
257 Id. § 6002(2). 
258 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-514b (West Supp. 2010). 
259 Id. § 38a-514b(a)(4). 
260 Id. § 38a-514b(d). 
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months, implying that annual evaluation requirements may be 
permissible.261 
Montana requires that all disability policies, certificates of insurance, 
or contracts must provide for coverage of diagnosis and treatment of 
ASD for minor children.262  The statute relies on the definitions in the 
most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.263  
However, the requirement only applies up to eighteen years of age, and 
it limits coverage of ABA therapy to $50,000 per year for children less 
than eight years of age and $20,000 per year for children between nine 
and eighteen years of age.264 
New Mexico requires coverage of diagnosis and treatment of ASD 
under all group health insurance plans for children nineteen years of age 
and younger.265  This bill provides a $36,000 annual maximum but 
imposes a $200,000 lifetime maximum.266  The Act also notes that services 
that are supposed to be covered under the IDEA may be excluded from 
the required coverage.267 
Nevada requires certain health care plans and insurance policies to 
provide an option of screening, diagnosis, and treatment of ASD for 
children under eighteen years of age (or twenty-two years of age if 
enrolled in high school).268  This law also provides for licensing of 
behavior analysts and certification of Autism behavior 
interventionists.269  On the other hand, Louisiana recently amended a 
statute to exempt individually underwritten, guaranteed renewable, 
limited benefit health insurance policies from the requirement for 
coverage of diagnosis and treatment of Autism spectrum disorders for 
children under seventeen years of age.270 
While the issue of health insurance coverage has attracted the 
attention of state legislatures, it is troubling that many of the laws 
contain age and monetary limits that deny a guarantee of coverage to 
many children and adults when coverage is most needed.  Hopefully the 
new federal health care reform law will diminish this problem. 
                                                 
261 Id. § 38a-514b(f)(2). 
262 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-515(1) (2009). 
263 Id. § 33-22-515(2). 
264 Id. § 33-22-515(4). 
265 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-49(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
266 Id. § 59A-22-49(B)(2). 
267 Id. § 59A-22-49(B)(5). 
268 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0435(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
269 Id. § 689A.0435(7)(d). 
270 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1050(H) (2009). 
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2. Education Legislation 
Some states have tackled the issue of education of children with 
ASDs through statute.  Delaware recently amended its state law to better 
conform to the IDEA.271  Other state laws have tackled more challenging 
issues.  New Jersey has a law allowing school districts to apply to the 
Commissioner to receive additional special education funding beyond 
the standard amount if they have “an unusually high rate of low-
incidence disabilities, such as autism.272  Illinois requires IEP teams to 
consider a number of factors when creating an IEP for a child with an 
ASD.273  These factors include the verbal and nonverbal communication 
needs of the child, the need to develop social interaction skills, the needs 
resulting from the child’s unusual responses to sensory experiences and 
resistance to changes in daily routines, and the need for positive 
behavioral intervention.274  Michigan has a regulation requiring that 
classrooms for students with Autism have no more than five students 
and that the teachers in these classrooms have special training in 
addressing ASDs.275 
Nevada developed a competitive grant fund to be used for training 
of school professionals to work with students with ASD, from diagnosis 
through intervention.276  Additionally, the Act requires the Department 
of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services to 
ensure that there are professionals with qualifications to work with 
students with ASD.277 
Missouri codified the creation of five regional Autism programs 
throughout the state; the regional programs are responsible for 
coordination of a system of care responsive to the unique needs of the 
region and required parental advisory councils.278  Services to be 
included in the programs include therapy, respite care, communication 
therapies, and advocacy training.279 
Texas codified an Autism resource center to be run by the Health 
and Human Services Commissioner to coordinate a system of care for 
individuals with Autism and other pervasive developmental 
                                                 
271 H.B. 396, 145th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2010). 
272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-55(g) (West 2010). 
273 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
274 Id.  
275 MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1758 (2009). 
276 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.405 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). 
277 Id. § 391.410. 
278 MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 633.220(2), (3), (5) (West Supp. 2010). 
279 Id. § 633.220(4). 
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disorders.280  The center is required to provide training to various 
professionals who are likely to work with students with ASD.281  
Similarly, Alabama created Autism centers to coordinate services 
between the government and the school system for individuals with 
Autism and their families.282 
3. Workgroups and Taskforces 
Many states have demonstrated an interest in studying the 
prevalence, impact, early diagnosis, treatment, and education of children 
with ASD by establishing formal working groups or taskforces assigned 
to prepare reports and recommendations on these very issues.  Once 
again, ASD has been treated as separate from other disabilities as states 
do not often establish separate workgroups for individual disabilities.  
This level of legislative attention underscores the enormous impact of the 
prevalence of ASDs.  Many states have appointed commissions and/or 
taskforces to study the state’s current approach to ASDs and to provide 
recommendations for improvement.283  While the increased recognition 
of the prevalence of Autism is an important step forward, it remains to 
be seen how states will react to the recommendations that result from the 
various taskforces.  Specifically, many of the state-designated groups 
discussed do not necessarily have a budget, full-time staff, 
implementation powers, or permanence.  Each of these factors limits the 
power of the groups to create true change. 
In addition to appointing taskforces and work groups to report on 
services for the needs of individuals with ASDs, some states have 
recognized that families need support as well.  The Illinois General 
Assembly recently directed the Department of Children and Family 
Services to develop a support program for families who are struggling to 
care for a child with a pervasive developmental disorder.284  Missouri 
and Kentucky have both created Applied Behavior Therapy boards, 
                                                 
280 TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 114.013 (West Supp. 2010). 
281 Id. § 114.013(b)(2). 
282 ALA. CODE § 22-57-20 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
283  See, e.g., 2010 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS 206 (creating the Autism Spectrum Disorder Task 
Force); ARK. CODE ANN § 10-3-2603 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 13-2801 
to 13-2806 (LexisNexis 2009) (creating a Commission on Autism); N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:6D-
62.4 (West 2009) (directing the Commissioner of Human Services to establish an Asperger’s 
Syndrome Pilot Initiative); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-06-32 (Supp. 2009) (creating the Autism 
Spectrum Disorder Taskforce). 
284 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(l) (Supp. 2009). 
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which are tasked with reviewing licensing processes for behavior 
analysts.285 
Perhaps the most effective task force on ASD was not created by the 
legislature but by the executive branch.  In 2004, the Pennsylvania 
Commissioner of Public Welfare convened a broad-based task force 
consisting of government officials, parents, consumers, and experts to 
study issues relating to ASD.286  This task force produced a report in 2004 
recommending the creation of a Bureau of Autism Services.  As a result, 
the Bureau of Autism Services was founded in 2007 as a branch of the 
Office of Developmental Disabilities in the Department of Public 
Welfare.287 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The growing prevalence of ASD has triggered enormous advocacy 
activity.  Individual litigation—not class actions—remains a major 
strategy concerning ASD.  For example, a quick search on LexisNexis as 
of March 2010 reveals 691 federal court cases in the last ten years with 
the words “Autism” and “IDEA.”  Of those, 507 were in the last five 
years and 248 were within the last two years.  These numbers represent 
only cases in federal courts, and the IDEA requires parents to exhaust 
administrative remedies through due process administrative procedures 
before proceeding to court.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
thousands of due process cases involving ASD issues under the IDEA 
have been filed in this decade.  These numbers are indicative of the sheer 
volume of ASD cases litigated, as ASD has become an epidemic that our 
country must address.  The case law reviewed in this Article reveals the 
changes in disability education law and policy resulting from the trend.  
Such changes, and their ultimate impact, have thus far gone unnoticed.  
The law has been changed for all children with disabilities by this 
volume of court decisions in a wide range of areas—parental burden of 
proof, pendency during transition from Part C to Part B, the definitions 
of “least restrictive environment,” and qualified professionals as well as 
requirement for reimbursement.  The differences among the federal 
                                                 
285 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 319C.030 (West Supp. 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 337.305 
(Westlaw through the end of the 2010 First Extraordinary Session of the 95th General 
Assembly). 
286 The Case for More and Better Research, AUTISM CENTRAL PA, 
http://pennstatehershey.org/sites/autismcentralpa/research/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2010) 
(reviewing the subcommittee’s findings). 
287 Kim Goff, Bureau of Autism Services—A Valuable Resource for the Autism Community, 
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 26, 2009, 3:59 PM), http://www.examiner.com/special-needs-kids-in-
philadelphia/bureau-of-autism-services-a-valuable-resource-for-the-autism-community. 
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circuit courts on many critical issues are compounding confusion.  Most 
of these results were created by cases that largely focused on parental 
reimbursement—a risk that most parents with children with ASD and 
other disabilities cannot take.  Those cases created law on ancillary issues 
that have ramifications for all children with disabilities.  This result cries 
out for a more coordinated litigation strategy similar to the efforts to 
establish the right to education.288  It would begin with lawyers 
communicating about ASD issues and planning and developing targeted 
litigation.289 
This Article has identified the early impact of ASD litigation on 
education and disability law, including the development of standards for 
evaluating diagnosis and treatment under the IDEA and increased 
attention from both state and federal government.  While the true 
ramifications will not be known for some time, it is clear that law and 
policy must focus on effective, evidence-based interventions and 
establishment of appropriate treatment programs for children with 
ASDs.  That research must focus on finding effective treatment 
modalities including the recommended level of intensity for children 
and adults.  These suggestions echo the new recommendations of the 
federal research advisory body.290 
Thus, there needs to be a clear advocacy strategy established for 
ASD that plans major litigation as well as state and federal legislation.  
This is precisely what happened in the disability rights field prior to the 
enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children’s Act in 
l975.291  Without a targeted and planned strategy, states will continue to 
create bad law adversely affecting children with ASD and other 
disabilities and enact legislation with limited benefit for those children 
and adults with ASD.  With all the activity generated by Autism 
awareness efforts, it is time to channel those effort to go to the next 
step—targeted, planned, and cohesive advocacy efforts that include 
parents, physicians, attorneys, and other professionals.  Only through 
such effective advocacy efforts will law and policy reflect the true needs 
of children and adults with ASD. 
                                                 
288 See, e.g. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868–71 (D.D.C. 1972) (coordinated class 
action litigation establishing the right to education); see also SHERYL DICKER & MARK I. 
SOLER, STEPPING STONES:  SUCCESSFUL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN 113−55 (1990) (use of 
multistrategic advocacy efforts to establish the right of children with disabilities to attend 
regular schools). 
289 DICKER & SOLER, supra note 288. 
290 See IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 24–25 (identifying research needs). 
291 Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975). 
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